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LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
All parties to the proceedings below are identified in the caption on appeal. The
only parties to this appeal are plaintiffs/appellees Gina and Charlie Arnold and
defendant/appellant David Grigsby.
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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(a).
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue: Did the Court of Appeals correctly hold that the out-of-state tolling statute,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35, tolled the two-year statute of limitations in the Utah Health
Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4, during the periods of time that defendant
Grigsby was absent from the state of Utah after the Arnolds' causes of action accrued?
Preservation: At the Court of Appeals, this issue was addressed in appellees' Brief
in Opposition to Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari. In the trial court, the issue was
addressed in plaintiffs memorandum opposition defendant's motion for summary judgment
(R. 685-750), and in the reply memorandum in support of defendant's motion for summary
judgment (R. 768-834).
Standard of Review: On a writ of certiorari, this Court reviews the decision of the
Court of Appeals, not that of the trial court. Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah
1997). The Court reviews the Court of Appeals' conclusions of law for correctness, giving
its conclusions of law no deference. State v. Casey, 2003 UT 33, % 10, 82 P.3d 1106.
Application of the statute of limitations is a question of law. In re Hoopiiaina Trust, 2006
UT 53, Tj 19, 144 P.3d 1129.

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES1
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35, the out-of-state tolling provision:
Where a cause of action accrues against a person when he is out of the state,
the action may be commenced within the term as limited by this chapter
after his return to the state. If after a cause of action accrues he departs
from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time limited for the
commencement of the action.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4, the medical malpractice statute of limitations, in
pertinent part:
(1)
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient
discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years
after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence . . . .
(2)
The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of
minority or other legal disability under § 78-12-36 or any other provision of
the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships,
associations and corporations and to all health care providers and to all
malpractice actions against health care providers based upon alleged
personal injuries which occurred prior to the effective date of this act;. ..
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36, the disability tolling provision:
If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for the recovery of real
property, is at the time the cause of action accrued, incompetent and without
a legal guardian, the time of the disability is not part of the time limited for
the commencement of the action.

Title 78 of the Utah Code was recently recodified. For clarity, this brief cites to the
version of the Code in effect at the time of, and cited in, the Court of Appeals opinion.
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition Below
Gina and Charlie Arnold brought this action against defendants Gary White, M.D.,
David Grigsby, M.D., and the Uintah Basin Medical Center alleging medical malpractice in
connection with the perforation of Gina Arnold's colon and certain subsequent treatment
beginning July 22, 1999. (R. 185-186.)
On December 4, 2001, plaintiffs filed the underlying Complaint and Jury Demand in
the Third Judicial District. (R. 1; R. 854.) Although Dr. Grigsby was listed as a defendant,
the Arnolds did not include him in the medical malpractice pre-litigation process, and he
was not served with the Complaint. (As discussed infra, the plaintiffs did not have a basis
for doing so until October 2003.)
Dr. White successfully challenged venue, obtaining a transfer of the case to the
Eighth Judicial District. (R. 15; R. 101.) The case then proceeded to the discovery phase.
On October 29, 2003, plaintiffs deposed Dr. White. During that deposition, Dr. White
averred for the first time that it has actually been Dr. Grigsby, not Dr. White, who was
directing Gina Arnold's care after the initial perforation of Mrs. Arnold's colon. Upon
learning this (alleged) information, plaintiffs served Dr. Grigsby with the complaint and
initiated the medical malpractice pre-litigation process with respect to him. The parties
subsequently stipulated to a dismissal without prejudice of plaintiffs' claims against Dr.
Grigsby pending completion of the pre-litigation hearing. (R. 174; R 177.)
By stipulation, the Arnolds filed an Amended Complaint and Jury Demand on
August 6, 2004. (R. 182; R. 184.) On September 22, 2005, after additional discovery,
3

defendant Grigsby filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the two-year
statute of limitations on the Arnolds' claims against him had expired on August 17, 2001,
approximately three and a half months before the original complaint was filed on December
4, 2001. (R. 579-584.) (In his reply memorandum, defendant Grigsby moved the alleged
date upon which the Arnolds discovered their cause of action to November 16, 1999, under
which the statute of limitations would have run on November 16, 2001.) (R. 774-776.)
In opposing the motion for summary judgment, the Arnolds argued that Dr. Grigsby
had not adduced any evidence (let alone uncontroverted evidence) as to when they
"discovered], or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury,
whichever first occurs," as required to establish the accrual (and expiration) of the statute of
limitations. (R. 686-687.) The Arnolds argued that the two-year statute of limitations did
not begin to run on claims against Dr. Grigsby until they first obtained information as to his
potential negligence, as contrasted with information about another defendant's potential
negligence. (R. 689-693.) Plaintiffs argued that, if Dr. White was telling the truth, the
medical records prepared by Drs. White and Grigsby were misleading, and appellants could
not have known that Dr. Grigsby was allegedly directing her care rather than Dr. White until
Dr. White's deposition in October 2003. (R. 688-693, 695-700.) Finally, the Arnolds
argued that, where Dr. Grigsby had departed the state of Utah in approximately June 2000,
his absence from the state tolled the statute of limitations under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35
(the out-of-state tolling provision). (R. 700-703.)
By orders dated November 21 and December 20, 2005, the trial court granted Dr.
Grigsby's motion, dismissing plaintiffs' claims against him. (R. 853; Appendix Exh. B and
4

C.) In reaching this conclusion, the trial court first found that the statute of limitations
began to run more than two years before the filing of the complaint on December 4, 2001.
(R. 853-860.)
The trial court then turned to whether the statute of limitations was tolled by Dr.
Grigsby's move from Utah to Tennessee in 2000.

(R. 853-860.)

In support of his

contention that the out-of-state tolling statute did not apply, Dr. Grigsby asserted two
theories. First, he argued that the language of the medical malpractice act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-14-4(2), precludes the application of any tolling statute. (R. 782-785.) Second, he
argued that even if the out-of-state tolling statute did apply to medical malpractice actions, it
would not apply to him because he remained amenable to service of process while he was
out of state. (R. 786-790.)
The trial court rejected Dr. Grigsby's argument that the Health Care Malpractice Act
precluded application of the out-of-state tolling statute.

However, the court granted

summary judgment based upon Dr. Grigsby's "more compelling argument" that the tolling
statute does not toll the statute of limitations against persons who depart the state after the
claim arises if the defendant remains amenable to service under Utah's long-arm statute.
(R. 854-855.)
After the claims against Dr. Grigsby were dismissed, Dr. White filed a Notice of
Intent to allocate Fault to Dr. Grigsby. (R. 894.) On May 2, 2006, the court certified its
November 21, 2005, order as final under U.R.Civ.P. 54(b) (R. 904.) The Arnolds filed their
notice of appeal on May 22, 2006 (R. 907), and the trial court stayed the remaining claims
pending the appeal. (R. 905.)
5

At issue in the Utah Court of Appeals were (1) whether the trial court improperly
resolved issues of fact as to when the statute of limitations began to run, and (2) whether the
trial court erred in ruling that Dr. Grigsby's departure from the state of Utah did not toll the
statute of limitations. After the Arnolds' opening brief was filed, this Court resolved in
their favor what had been a principal issue on appeal, holding that "section 78-12-35 [the
out-of-state tolling provision] does toll the applicable statute of limitations when a person
against whom a claim has accrued has left the state of Utah and has no agent within the
state upon whom service of process can be made, even where that person was at all times
amenable to service pursuant to Utah's long-arm statute." Olseth v. Larsen, 2007 UT 29, \
40, 158 P.3d 532 (emphasis in original).
Inasmuch as Olseth eliminated the primary argument upon which Dr. Grigsby
prevailed at the trial level, Dr. Grigsby's focus on appeal shifted to his contention that the
tolling statute simply did not apply to medical malpractice claims at all, the argument that
the trial court had rejected. (R. 853-860.)
The Court of Appeals issued its opinion on February 28, 2008. (Appendix Exh. A.)
The court held that the Health Care Malpractice Act is subject to the out-of-state tolling
provision, and therefore the statute of limitations was tolled by Dr. Grigsby's departure
from the state. Because its ruling on that issue was dispositive, the court did not reach the
Arnolds' argument that the trial court improperly resolved issues of fact as to when the
statute of limitations began to run.
Dr. Grigsby filed his Petition for Writ of Certiorari on March 26, 2008. This Court
granted the writ on June 13, 2008.
6

Statement of Facts
The record contains the following facts presented to the Court of Appeals,
including reasonable inferences therefrom:
Dr. Gary White perforated Gina Arnold's colon while performing a colonoscopy on
July 22, 1999. Dr. Grigsby had no involvement in that event. (R. 716.) The day after her
colonoscopy, Mrs. Arnold went to the emergency room at Uintah Basin Medical Center
("UBMC") complaining of pain in her lower abdomen. Dr. Grigsby was not involved in
that visit. (R. 715.)
On that date, July 23, 1999, Dr. White diagnosed Mrs. Arnold as having a
perforation of the colon. (R. 715.) That same day, he admitted Gina Arnold into UBMC
and treated her in the hospital for four days with antibiotics. (R. 703, 705, 715.) He
discharged Mrs. Arnold from UBMC on July 27, 1999. At that time, he directed her to
continue taking oral antibiotics and to obtain IV antibiotics at the emergency room twice a
day until he could see her again three days later. (R. 703.)
Despite the antibiotic treatment, Gina Arnold's condition worsened. On August 3,
1999, she returned to Dr. White, who admitted her to UBMC to perform laparoscopic
surgery. (R. 707, 719-720.) Dr. White performed the surgery that same day. (R. 709, 721.)
At some point after Dr. White began the August 3, 1999, laparoscopic surgery on
Gina Arnold, Dr. Grigsby entered the operating room and assisted with the procedure. (R.
721.) (Dr. White's Operating Report states that Dr. White was the surgeon and Dr. Grigsby
only assisted him. Id.) Dr. Grigsby did not prepare an operative report for the procedure.

7

On August 5, 1999, Dr. White performed another exploratory laparoscopic surgery
with irrigation and drainage on Gina Arnold. Dr. Grigsby was not present at this surgery.
(R. 726.) A fourth laparoscopy was performed on Mrs. Arnold by Dr. Grigsby on August
11, 1999. (R. 800.) On or about August 16, Mrs. Arnold was transferred to St. Mark's
Hospital for treatment. (R. 806, p. 36.)
In late 1999, the Arnolds consulted with an attorney to help them investigate what
had happened with regard to Mrs. Arnold's medical treatment at UBMC. On November 16,
1999, Harold A. Hintze mailed a letter to UBMC requesting a copy of Gina Arnold's
medical records. Hintze's letter indicated that he represented Mrs. Arnold "relative to
treatment she received following complication arising from an initial diagnosis and
treatment of her for an intestinal condition by Dr. Gary White.

We are still in the

investigatory stage of our representation." (R. 825.)
The sequence of events described above is what the medical records reflected at that
time.

On October 29, 2003, Dr. White was deposed.

During the deposition, White

contradicted his own written medical records and those of Dr. Grigsby, suddenly claiming
that Grigsby had been making the decisions regarding Gina Arnold's care, even with
respect to surgeries at which he was not present. For example:
Dr. White claimed for the first time that, as soon as Dr. Grigsby entered the
operating room on August 3, White was no longer Gina Arnold's primary doctor and Mrs.
Arnold became Grigsby's case. (R. 722.) Dr. White also claimed in his deposition for the
first time that, contrary to the August 3, 1999, Operating Report which said that White was
the surgeon and Dr. Grigsby only "assisted" him (R. 709), it was Grigsby who decided not
8

to convert the laparoscopic procedure that day into an open procedure, contrary to Dr.
White's preference. (R. 721-725).
Dr. White further claimed in his deposition that, even though Dr. Grigsby was not
present at the August 5 surgery, he nevertheless performed the surgery according to Dr.
Grigsby's direction, rather than using his own judgment, which was to perform a different
operation. (R. 730-731.)
Dr. White testified in his deposition that from August 3, 1999, when Dr. Grigsby
entered the room in which he was operating on Gina Arnold, he deferred to Dr. Grigsby's
judgment 100 percent of the time because Dr. Grigsby was in charge and was the patient's
doctor. (R.731-732).2
The Arnolds were never informed of this alleged transformation of Dr. Grigsby's
role in Gina Arnold's treatment. On the contrary, Dr. White led them to believe that he
was the doctor directing Mrs. Arnold's care. For example, when Charlie Arnold spoke to
Dr. White around August 12th or 13th and raised the possibility of involving another
doctor or hospital, Dr. White strongly resisted, saying: "Have you lost faith in me? You
don't trust me?" (R. 749-750.) Nor is there any evidence that Dr. Grigsby advised the
Arnolds that he was now directing Gina Arnold's care.
Dr. Grigsby lived in Roosevelt, Utah, until approximately July, 2000, when he
moved to Oneida, Tennessee. (R. 735.)

In his deposition (R. 736-746), Dr. Grigsby disputed this testimony, and plaintiffs are
skeptical of its accuracy. Nevertheless, it is apparent that White's strategy is to try to pass
responsibility to Grigsby as an empty chair, hence the Notice of Intent to Allocate Fault.
9

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court should affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals that the two-year
statute of limitation set forth in the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, U.C.A. § 78-144(2) ("malpractice statute of limitation"), is tolled by the out-of-state tolling statute, U.C.A. § 7812-35 ("out-of-state tolling statute"), while a healthcare malpractice defendant is absent from the
State of Utah. The Court of Appeals properly rejected Dr. Grigsby's assertion that the plain
language of the malpractice statute of limitation renders the out-of-state tolling statute
inapplicable, and correctly held that the plain language of the statute only precludes tolling
during periods of the plaintiffs minority or legal disability, as opposed to precluding tolling
during periods of the defendant's absence from the state.
The Court of Appeals properly concluded that the Utah Legislature has not
evidenced a clear legislative intent in any other provision of the Healthcare Malpractice Act
("Act") to exempt the malpractice statute of limitation from the out-of-state tolling statute.
In fact, the legislative history of Section 78-14-4 reinforces the Court of Appeals' analysis.
Contrary to Grigsby's assertions, the Court of Appeals properly held that the
general legislative declaration in 78-14-2 does not require a finding that the out-of-state
tolling statute is inapplicable to claims against health care provider defendants, because
application of the out-of-state tolling statute to medical malpractice claims does not defeat
the purpose of the Act, and "still substantially limits the statute of limitations period for
malpractice actions and still provides the needed predictability for insurance companies in
the vast majority of cases." Opinion at ^} 19. The appointment of an agent for service of
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process, an inexpensive and simple procedure, previously approved by this Court,
alleviates the alleged ill effects of the tolling statute.
Finally, Dr. Grigsby's attempt to raise constitutional objections to the out-of-state
tolling statute for the first time on certiorari is untimely and improper. This Court has
repeatedly held that a party may not raise issues for the first time on appeal.
ARGUMENT
L

THE COURT OF APPEALS CORRECTLY HELD THAT UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-12-35 TOLLS THE HEALTH CARE
MALPRACTICE ACT STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DURING A
DEFENDANT'S ABSENCE FROM THE STATE.

The medical malpractice statute of limitation reads, with the language interpreted
by the Court of Appeals underlined, as follows:
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it
is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through
the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first
occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission,
neglect or occurrence . . . .
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority
or other legal disability under § 78-12-36 or any other provision of the law, and
shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and corporations
and to all health care providers and to all malpractice actions against health care
providers based upon alleged personal injuries which occurred prior to the
effective date of this act; . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4 (emphasis added).
Although Dr. Grigsby's primary argument to the Court of Appeals was that the
medical malpractice statute of limitation is plain and unambiguous, and he made the same
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assertion in his Petition for Writ of Certiorari3, he now argues to this Court that the statute is
actually ambiguous. Accordingly, he asks this Court to look to other provisions in the Act
to divine a legislative intent that the out-of-state tolling statute should be inapplicable.
As discussed below, Dr. Grigsby had it right the first time: the malpractice statute of
limitations is clear and unambiguous. The Court of Appeals' and trial court's interpretation
is the only reasonable interpretation of the structure and wording of the statute. Even if the
statute were considered ambiguous, however, legislative history and this Court's precedent
reinforces the correctness of the Court of Appeals' decision.
A.
Section 78-14-4 is unambiguous, and it is irrelevant whether federal courts
have ascribed a different meaning to it.
As this Court has repeatedly made clear, "[w]hen interpreting a statute, we turn to
standard canons of statutory construction. In so doing, our primary goal is to give effect to
the legislature's intent. We first look to the plain language of the statute and give effect to
that language unless it is ambiguous. Only where that language is ambiguous do we consult

"By the plain language of the Act, it is clear that other general tolling provisions are
inapplicable to medical malpractice claims." Brief of Appellee Grigsby at 16; "The plain
language of the Act demonstrates that the specific language of Section 78-14-4(2) was
included to accomplish this purpose. Disregarding the plain language that "The
provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of ... any other provision
of the law" would render the words used in the Act superfluous or inoperative." Brief of
Appellee Grigsby at 20; "This particular provision [78-14-4(2)] clearly provides that the
Utah Legislature did not intend tolling provisions - such as section 78-12-35 - to affect
the limitations period." Id. at 26. "The express statutory language specifying that these
provisions apply regardless of any other provision of the law clearly demonstrates the
intent of the legislation [sic] that the Act be exempted from any other tolling statutes."
Grigsby Pet*. Writ Cert, at 7; "The plain and clear language of the Act demonstrates that
the specific language of Section 78-14-(2) was included to accomplish this purpose[.]"
Id. at 9. (Emphasis added to all citations).
12

other sources for its meaning." Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Ewart, 2007 UT 52, \ 16, 167
P.3dl011.
The Court of Appeals noted that courts are charged with honoring, not ignoring,
the actual wording of statutes. Courts "presume that the legislature used each word
advisedly and gave effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning,"
and "will avoid an interpretation which renders portions of, or words in, a statute
superfluous or inoperative." Opinion at ^f 12, citing Arrendondo v. Avis Rent A Car Sys.,
Inc., 2001 UT 29, f 12, 24 P.3d 928, and Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658,
662 (Utah 1979).
The only reasonable interpretation of Section 78-14-4 is exactly what it says: that
its statute of limitations applies despite a plaintiffs minority or legal disability under any
provision of law, including under U.C.A. 78-12-36. Dr. Grigsby takes no position in his
brief before this Court regarding the proper interpretation of Section 78-14-4, but rests
entirely on the assumption that this Court will find it ambiguous. Nonetheless, it bears
noting that the interpretation urged by Dr. Grigsby in the proceedings below and in his
Petition for Writ of Certiorari would be contrary to the plain language of Section 78-144(2).

A contention that malpractice claims are never subject to tolling under any

provision of Utah law would require an awkward and strained reading of the statute's
language, and would disregard the structure and punctuation of the provision.4

4

To illustrate, in order to make his statutory interpretation to the Court of Appeals, Dr.
Grigsby had to rely on ellipses and bold emphasis to deemphasize intervening words in
the statute. Thus, Dr. Grigsby condensed Section 78-14-4 (2) to state, 'The provisions of
13

As the Court of Appeals determined, the trial court "astutely analyzed the issued as
follows:
[I]t is clear to the Court that the language 'or any other provision of the law' refers
only to other provisions of the law which define iegal disability.' This reading is
supported by the fact that this language is contained within a dependent clause
which refers back to, and clarifies the meaning of, the term 'all persons.' The
clause 'regardless of minority or other legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or
any other provision of law' is contained within a single set of commas, indicating
to this Court that the legislature intended the clause to refer to party status, rather
than to removing this provision from the scope of all other provisions of law.
Therefore, the Court rejects Defendants' argument on this point."
Opinion, ^f 14, quoting R. 854-855. This conclusion, in addition to giving meaning to all
words in the statute, is consistent with standard principles of statutory construction.
"Under the last antecedent doctrine, relative and qualifying words, phrases, and clauses
are to be applied to the immediately preceding words or phrase." Corpus Juris Secundum
Statutes § 333; Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 219 (Utah 1992).
The Court of Appeals, agreeing with the trial court's reading of the statute on this
point, correctly observed that, had the Legislature intended the medical malpractice twoyear statute of limitation to "be beyond the reach of all other tolling statutes, including
those unrelated to 'minority or other legal disability, it would have explicitly said so."
Opinion at ^| 18.

this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of. . . any other provision of the law[.]"
(Brief of Appellee, p. 18 (ellipse in original); see also id., p. 24: "The provisions of this
section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability under
Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the law") (bold in original).)
14

In an about-face from his position in the lower courts, Dr. Grigsby's primary
argument before this Court is that Section 78-14-4(2) is ambiguous, and therefore, he says,
the Court should look beyond its plain language and "harmonize" its provisions with other
provisions of the Utah Healthcare Malpractice Act. In support of his claim that Section 7814-4(2) is ambiguous, Grigsby relies not on the actual language of the statute, but instead
two decisions from the federal District of Utah and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, as
well as to the trial court and court of appeals' interpretation of the statute in this case.
As the Court of Appeals noted, a federal court's interpretation of a Utah statute is of
no precedential value to this Court (Opinion at f 13, n.4), and therefore, federal court
decisions purporting to construe the statute at issue are not controlling. In addition to
lacking precedential value, the analysis set forth in the federal court decisions on which
Dr. Grigsby relies is flawed. In the unreported federal district court decision of GriffithsRast v. Sulzer Spine Tech, Inc., 2005 WL 2237635 (D. Utah 2005), aff'd 216 Fed. Appx.
790 (10th Cir. 2007) (mem.), the judge ignored the plain language of Section 78-14-4(4).
The analysis in Griffiths-Rast focused solely on the "all persons" language, without
consideration of the phrase immediately following it, which "explains the rationale for
such a provision: Bur for the Legislature's desire to make its point about the irrelevancy
of 'minority or other legal disability,' there would be no reason to include such a
provision at all." Opinion, f 13 n.4. The Court of Appeals correctly discounted the
persuasiveness of Griffiths-Rast because the analysis in that case, like Dr. Grigsby,
ignores the express wording in the medical malpractice statute of limitation. As to the
Tenth Circuit's opinion in Griffiths-Rast v. Sulzer Spine Tech, 216 Fed. Appx. 790 (10th
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Cir. 2007)(unpublished), it is similarly of no precedential value, and represents an
incorrect analysis of the statute at issue.5
Dr. Grigsby asserts that the lower courts in this very case have also attributed
different meanings to Section 78-14-4(2), and then says that this suggests an ambiguity. In
making that argument, however, Dr. Grigsby takes the lower courts' opinions out of context
and misconstrues the Court of Appeals' holding. The trial court and the Court of Appeals
attributed the same meaning to the Section 78-14-4(2), and their respective ruling and
opinion do not demonstrate any ambiguity in the statute. To the contrary, the Court of
Appeals cited favorably the trial court's ruling in its own analysis of the issue. Both
courts concluded that the words "or any other provision of the law" "referfed] to party
status, rather than to removing this [two-year limitation] provision from the scope of all
other provisions of law." Opinion at ^} 14.
The questioned ambiguity in this case is not whether the latter phrase "or any other
provision of the law" modifies the word "minority" or the word "legal disability," but
rather, whether the later phrase "or any other provision of the law" applies to the earlier

5

One reason for the ruling in Griffiths-Rast may be that the statutory-language argument
upon which the Court of Appeals ruled here was not raised in the federal district court. In
Griffiths-Rast, the defendant filed a motion for summary judgment based on the two-year
statute of limitations. Griffiths-Rast v. Sulzer Spine Tech, et ai, 2:02-cv-01267, U. S.
District Court, Central Division (Docket No. 59). In response, the plaintiff raised the outof-state tolling provision. (Docket No. 65.) In his reply, the doctor asserted for the first
time that the out-of-state tolling provision does not apply to medical malpractice claims.
(Docket No. 73.) The plaintiff did not have an opportunity to, and did not, argue that the
medical malpractice statute addressed only disability-related tolling provisions. Given
that the relevant arguments were not raised or briefed before the federal district court, its
discussion of the statute provides little insight here.
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phrase stating, "the provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of..."
Both courts below reached the same conclusion - that it does not - and the holdings of
the lower courts do not support an argument that the statute is ambiguous.
The medical malpractice statute of limitation in Section 78-14-4(2) is plain and
unambiguous, as both lower courts concluded. It provides that the two-year malpractice
statute of limitation is not tolled by minority or legal disability arising under any provision
of Utah law. It does not provide that the two-year malpractice statute of limitation is
excepted from the out-of-state tolling statute. The Court of Appeals' reasoning was
sound.
B.
The application of well-accepted principles of statutory construction to
Section 78-14-4 mandates the conclusion that the Legislature did not intend to exempt
health care malpractice claims from the out-of-state tolling provisions of Section 78-12-35.
The Court of Appeals noted that, had the Legislature intended the malpractice statute
of limitation to "be beyond the reach of all other tolling statutes, including those unrelated
to 'minority or other legal disability,' it would have explicitly said so." Opinion at If 18.
Indeed, "[t]he Utah Legislature has demonstrated that if it seeks specifically to exempt a
statute from the tolling statute, it will do so with clear, explicit language." Bonneville
Asphalt v. Labor Cornrn'n, 2004 UT App 137, % 8, 91 P.3d 849, 852 (Utah App.2004).
Here, there is an utter absence of clear, explicit language stating that the tolling statute
does not apply to medical malpractice claims.
The multitude of ways that the Legislature could have clearly expressed such an
intention is evidence that its absence was intentional. As an example, all the Legislature
would have needed to do to resolve the entire question before this Court is to include
17

another sentence in Section 78-14-4(2) stating something like 'the two-year statute of
limitations set forth in subsection (1) is not subject to tolling under Section 78-12-35.'
That is very plain and unambiguous language. Such language is notably absent, however,
and nothing similar is contained anywhere in the Healthcare Malpractice Act.
It is a well-accepted maxim of statutory construction that "expressio unius est
exclusio alterius" - that the expression of one thing is evidence of the exclusion of the
other.

See, e.g., Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, U 30, 104 P.3d 1208

(""statutory construction presumes that the expression of one should be interpreted as the
exclusion of another.")

The Legislature chose to state specifically that the two-year

malpractice statute of limitations applies without regard for minority or legal disability
under Section 78-12-36. It did not state anything in the Act about other tolling statutes,
such as the immediately preceding section, 78-12-35.
In Olseth v. Larson, 2007 UT 29, % 39, 158 P.3d 532, a case holding that the outof-state tolling statute applies without regard for amenability to service of process, this
Court stated that it "the Utah Legislature is aware of the tolling statute ...." and that it
"presume[s] the Legislature is aware of [its] case law . . . ." regarding the out-of-state
tolling statute. This Court has a long jurisprudence of enforcing the provisions of the outof-state tolling statute. See, e.g., Keith-O'Brien Co. v. Snyder, 51 Utah 227, 169 P. 954
(1917); Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., 64 Utah 391, 231 P. 123 (1924); Goss v.
Hunting, 561 P.2d 1071 (Utah 1977). Although this Court has refined its interpretation of
the tolling statute, see, e.g., Lund v. Hall, 938 P.2d 285 (Utah 1997), its vitality has not
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been called into question. The legislature is thus presumed to be have been aware of
Section 78-12-35 when it amended the medical malpractice statute.
Grigsby argues in his brief before this Court that the case of Blum v. Stone, 752
P.2d 898 (Utah 1988) supports a conclusion that the out-of-state tolling provision in
Section 78-12-35 does not apply to medical malpractice claims. However, that case is
inapplicable to the case at bar, because in Blum, this Court only construed the interplay
between the two-year malpractice statute of limitation and the disability tolling provision
in Section 78-12-36. The Court afforded no consideration of Section 78-12-35, nor could
it, because there was no issue raised in that case regarding the defendant's absence from
the state after the accrual of a cause of action against him.
In sum, the lack of any express intent to exempt malpractice claims from tolling
under Section 78-12-36, prior jurisprudence from this Court construing the tolling statute,
the presumption that the Legislature chose its wording advisedly, and the express
inclusion of a reference to one tolling statute but not another in the malpractice statute of
limitation, all support the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the Legislature did not intend
to except the out-of-state tolling statute from the medical malpractice statute of limitation.
C.
The legislative history giving rise to the 1979 amendment of the malpractice
statute of limitations demonstrates that the Legislature had no intent to exempt health care
malpractice claims from the out-of-state tolling statute.
While concluding that Section 78-14-4 is unambiguous, the Court of Appeals
noted that the statute's legislative history is consistent with the court's interpretation. The
medical malpractice statute of limitation in Section 78-14-4 was enacted in 1976. As
enacted, the pertinent portion read:
19

The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons regardless of minority or
other disability and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships,
associations, and corporations and to all health care providers and to all
malpractice actions against health care providers based upon alleged personal
injuries which occurred prior to the effective date of this a c t ; . . . .
See Laws of the State of Utah, 1976, attached hereto as Exhibit D, and Blum, 753 P.2d at
900 (emphasis added).
The Legislature has amended Section 78-14-4 once, in 1979. The amendment was
expressly in response to a decision of this Court in Scott v. School Bd. of Granite School
District, 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977), which was decided one year after the malpractice
statute of limitation's enactment. In Scott, this Court held that the medical malpractice
statute of limitations was tolled under the disability tolling statute, Section 78-12-36, as a
result of the minor plaintiffs legal age and legal incapacity. In Scott, the plaintiff a minor
acting through his guardian ad litem, filed suit against a school district for injuries
received in a shop class. The minor, however, failed to give timely notice of his claim
under the Governmental Immunity Act. The trial court granted summary judgment to the
school district, holding that the statutory requirement for giving notice under the
Governmental Immunity Act trumped the disability tolling statute governing minors.
Overruling prior decisions, this Court reversed, holding that minors were entitled to the
protection afforded by the disability tolling statute in all cases. Id. at 748.
Soon afterward, in 1979, the Legislature amended Section 78-14-4(2) to include
the statutory provision at issue herein. The Legislature expressly stated that its intent was
to overturn Scott. See Blum, 752 P.2d at 900 n. 2 (mentioning floor discussions making
clear that the amendments to Section 78-14-4(2) were enacted "in order to overturn a
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Supreme Court decision which has recently come down," i.e. Scott). The new version of
the malpractice statute of limitation said (with the words added by the 1979 amendment
underlined):
The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or
other legal disability under § 78-12-36 or any other provision of the law, and shall
apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations, and corporations and
to all health care providers and to all malpractice actions against health care
providers based upon alleged personal injuries which occurred prior to the
effective date of this a c t ; . . . .
See Laws of the State of Utah, 1979, pp. 739-740, included herewith in Exhibit D.
The intent of the 1979 amendment was clear—the legislature did not want minority
or legal disability to toll the medical malpractice limitation period, hence the added
reference to Section 78-12-36. Even if Section 78-14-4 were considered ambiguous, this
history confirms the correctness of the Court of Appeals ruling.
D.
The Court of Appeals correctly held that the application of the out-of-state
tolling statute is not contrary to the purposes of the Healthcare Malpractice Act, and no
legislative intent to exempt the malpractice statute of limitations from the out-of-state
tolling statute is derived or inferred from the other provisions of the Act.
None of the provisions of the Healthcare Malpractice Act cited by Grigsby in his
brief to this Court states that the tolling statute set forth in Section 78-12-35 is excepted
from the two-year medical malpractice statute of limitation in Section 78-14-4(2). Rather
than pointing to a clear and unmistakable express intent, Dr. Grigsby asks this Court to
divine that intent from the general Legislative pronouncement in Section 78-14-2, as well
as a prior opinion from this Court quoting that section.
First, Dr. Grigsby cites prefatory language in the Act, which states, "the purpose of
the legislature [is] to provide a reasonable time in which actions may be commenced
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against health care providers while limiting that time to a specific period for which
professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated."
U.C.A. 78-14-2. However, as the Court of Appeals observed, the legislative declaration
in 78-14-2 does not require a finding that the out-of-state tolling statute is inapplicable to
claims against health care provider defendants, because application of the out-of-state
tolling statute to medical malpractice claims does not defeat the purpose of the Act.
As the Court of Appeals indicated, application of the out-of-state tolling statute
"still substantially limits the statute of limitations period for malpractice actions and still
provides the needed predictability for insurance companies in the vast majority of cases."
Opinion at f 19. Section 78-12-35 imposes a specific and well-defined period for tolling:
the period of the defendant's absence from the state after the claim arises. This is a
explicit and discrete period of time, which is easily comprehended and straightforward
from an analytical perspective.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that its "interpretation should not cause
malpractice insurance rates to increase and will not deter healthcare providers from
leaving Utah. ... [A] 11 medical providers need do to make sure the statute of limitations
is not tolled if they leave Utah is appoint an agent within Utah to receive service of
process for them." Opinion at ^ 19.

The mere appointment of agent for service of

process, an inexpensive and simple procedure, alleviates the effect of the tolling statute
on the medical malpractice statute of limitation.
Dr. Grigsby argues that he is "unaware" of any "statutory procedure in Utah that
permits a person who wishes to move out of state to register with the state for service of
22

process."

Brief of Appellant at 25.

Notably, Dr. Grigsby does argue that such

appointments are prohibited in Utah, but only that there is not a statute dealing with the
subject. There is no need for a statutory procedure authorizing a person to appoint an
agent for limited purposes; the law already affords individuals that ability.
II.

DR. GRIGSBY DID NOT PRESERVE ANY CONSTITUTIONAL
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE APPLICATION OF THE TOLLING
STATUTE.

Dr. Grigsby argues for the first time in Sections I.C. and I.D. of his brief that the
interpretation of the medical malpractice statute of limitation urged by the Arnolds, and
echoed by the trial court and Court of Appeals, imposes an "unreasonable burden on
interstate commerce." Brief of Appellant at 23. Implicitly acknowledging the absence of
any such contention in the courts below, Dr. Grigsby attempts to argue that it is the Court
of Appeals' interpretation of the statute that gives rise to the undue burden on interstate
commence, but this is merely a roundabout way of arguing that the out-of-state tolling
statute violates the dormant commerce clause of the United States Constitution.
Dr. Grigsby cannot claim that he had no opportunity to raise constitutional
objections until the Court of Appeals ruled. The Court of Appeals adopted the very same
interpretation of the statute as the trial court, and that the Arnolds expressly urged on
appeal. Having chosen not to raise any constitutional arguments in either the trial court or
the Court of Appeals, it is too late for Dr. Grigsby to do so now. This Court has
repeatedly held that a party may not raise issues for the first time on appeal, and that
issues not raised in the trial court are waived. See Gardner v. Board of County Com'rs of
Wasatch County, 2008 UT 6, ^| 32, 178 P.3d 893 (declining to address appellant's
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constitutional due process regulatory takings argument, and holding that "[b]ecause the
Landowners did not present that claim below, the claim is deemed waived and we will not
address it for the first time on appeal."); Coleman ex rel Schefski v. Stevens, 2000 UT 98,
U 9, 17 P3d 1122 (Utah 2000) (holding that plaintiff-appellant was precluded from
raising issue of "whether a person has a constitutional right to control his or her medical
treatment" because he failed to raise the issue before the trial court); State v. Holgate,
2000 UT 74, Tj 11, 10 P.3d 346 ("[C]laims not raised before the trial court may not be
raised on appeal....

[This] preservation rule applies to every claim, including

constitutional questions....").
Dr. Grigsby's brief does not identify any preservation of his constitutional
argument in the courts below. None of the record citations in his Statement of Issues
contains such an argument. The docket and index of the record on appeal reflect no court
filing raising the argument, nor did the trial court or the Court of Appeals address it.
Accordingly, it is not properly before this Court on certiorari.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs/appellees respectfully request that the
Court affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals.
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ORME, Judge:
fl
Gina M. Arnold and Charlie S. Arnold appeal the trial
court's summary judgment order in favor of David Grigsby, M.D.,
which concluded that the Arnolds1 claims were time-barred by the
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act's two-year statute of
limitations. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1) (2002). By reason
of the generally applicable tolling statute, which suspends the
running of a statute of limitations when a defendant departs from
Utah after a cause of action has accrued against him, see id.
§ 78-12-35, we reverse.

BACKGROUND1
%2
On July 22, 1999, Dr. Gary White performed a colonoscopy and
polypectomy on Gina Arnold, in the course of which he negligently
perforated her colon. The next day, Gina began experiencing pain
in her lower abdomen and sought treatment at the Uintah Basin
Medical Center's emergency room. Dr. White determined that her
colon appeared to be perforated and admitted her to the hospital,
prescribing triple antibiotics. She remained in the hospital for
four days, during which time her condition began to improve. Her
discharge plan called for her to continue taking one antibiotic
tablet orally and to return to the emergency room to receive two
additional antibiotics during the next three days.
\3
Gina's condition worsened, however, and on August 3, 1999,
she was again admitted to the hospital where Dr. White performed
an exploratory laparoscopic surgery. At some point during the
course of the surgery, Dr. David Grigsby entered the operating
room and began to participate in the procedure. Dr. White's
operative report indicates that he was the surgeon while Dr.
Grigsby assisted him. Gina later had two more laparoscopic
surgeries at the Uintah Basin Medical Center, one performed by
Dr. White on August 5, 1999, and another performed by Dr. Grigsby
on August 11, 1999. After the August 11 surgery, she was
transferred to St. Mark!s Hospital in Salt Lake City.
f4
The Arnolds filed a complaint on December 4, 2001, naming
Dr. White, the Uintah Basin Medical Center, and Dr. Grigsby as
defendants. The Arnolds did not, however, serve Dr. Grigsby with
a summons and complaint at that time. They maintain that, while
they knew Dr. Grigsby had some level of participation in at least
some of the surgeries, they did not originally serve him with the
complaint or a pre-suit notice of intent to commence an action
because they did not want to bring him into the litigation unless
they found evidence requiring them to do so. At the time they
filed their complaint, they claim they were under the impression
from the medical records that Dr. White was Gina's primary care
provider during the events in question, directed her course of
treatment, and was primarily responsible for any negligence that
caused her injury.

1. lfl[I]n reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we analyze the
facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.'" DOIT, Inc. v. Touche,
Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 841 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted)
(alteration in original). We recite the facts accordingly.
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f5
But when Dr. White was deposed on October 29, 2003, he made
several statements that contradicted the medical records. He
asserted that when Dr. Grigsby entered the operating room during
the August 3 surgery, the surgery became Dr. Grigsby's case and
Dr. Grigsby became Gina's primary doctor. Because Dr. Grigsby
was in charge, Dr. White said he deferred to Dr. Grigsby's
judgment. Dr. White stated that he felt Gina needed more
vigorous treatment during the August 3 surgery. He thought that
trying to locate a hole and "oversew[ing] the hole," if there was
one, was the best way to proceed. According to Dr. White,
however, Dr. Grigsby decided that just draining and washing out
the abdomen was the best course of action. Dr. White further
claimed that when he performed the August 5 surgery, he proceeded
according to Dr. Grigsby's instructions, even though he would
have performed the surgery differently. He asserted that he
would have tried, at that point, to close up the hole in her
colon and perform a colostomy, if necessary.
^6
After Dr. White's deposition, the Arnolds obtained a
dismissal without prejudice as to Dr. Grigsby. They then filed a
notice of intent to commence an action, filed an amended
complaint on August 6, 2004, and served Dr. Grigsby in Tennessee,
where he then lived. Dr. Grigsby moved for summary judgment on
September 22, 2005, arguing that the Arnolds' claims were barred
by the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act's statute of limitations.
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(1) (2002). The Arnolds opposed the
motion, claiming that the statute of limitations period was
tolled when Dr. Grigsby moved to Tennessee in July 2000, see id.
§ 78-12-35, 2 and that the complaint therefore was timely filed.
They additionally argued that, regardless of the tolling statute,
they timely filed their complaint within two years of the date
they learned that Dr. Grigsby played a more integral role in
Gina's healthcare than they had previously known.
%1
The trial court first determined that the statute of
limitations began running in November 1999 because the "[Arnolds]
discovered the alleged injury no later than November 1999" and
because "[a]t that time, [they] certainly suspected the alleged
2.

Section 78-12-35 provides:
Where a cause of action accrues against a
person when he is out of the state, the
action may be commenced within the term as
limited by this chapter after his return to
the state. If after a cause of action
accrues he departs from the state, the time
of his absence is not part of the time
limited for the commencement of the action.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 (2002).
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injury may have been caused by negligence." The trial court
reached this determination because " [Gina] Arnold consult[ed] an
attorney and initiatfed] a formal investigation in her potential
medical malpractice claim as early as September 1999" and because
the Arnolds knew or should have known that Dr. Grigsby had been
involved in Gina's healthcare at the time they discovered her
injury. Accordingly, the trial court determined that the
December 4, 2001, complaint was not filed within the two-year
statutory period.
%Q
In reaching its decision, the trial court determined that
the tolling statute, section 78-12-35, did not apply. See Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-35 (2002). Rejecting Dr. Grigsby's argument
that the tolling statute simply did not apply to medical
malpractice cases, the trial court nevertheless determined that
because Dr. Grigsby could have been served in accordance with
Utah's long-arm statute, see id. §§ 78-27-24 to -25, the tolling
statute did not work to suspend the running of the Malpractice
Act's two-year limitations period, even though Dr. Grigsby was a
nonresident and absent from the state. Consequently, it granted
Dr. Grigsby's summary judgment motion. The Arnolds now appeal
that ruling.

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
f9
The Arnolds claim that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment to Dr. Grigsby on the theory that section 78-1235 did not toll the running of the statute of limitations even
though Dr. Grigsby had moved from Utah.3 "'Summary judgment is
appropriate when there is no issue as to any material fact and
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'"
Emergency Physicians Integrated Care v. Salt Lake County, 2 0 07 UT
72, H 8, 167 P.3d 1080 (quoting Dairyland Ins. Co. v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 882 P.2d 1143, 1144 (Utah 1994)).
"When
reviewing a ruling on summary judgment, this court gives no
deference to the lower court's legal conclusions and reviews the
issues presented under a correctness standard." Id. "[W]e
analyze the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom

3. The Arnolds also argue that even without the tolling statute,
they timely filed their lawsuit against Dr. Grigsby because the
statute of limitations in medical malpractice actions does not
begin to run until the injured party becomes aware of his or her
injury and aware that a particular doctor's negligence caused
that injury, not just that any doctor's negligence or that some
negligent act caused the injury. In light of our reversal of the
trial court's determination that section 78-12-35 did not apply,
we need not reach this argument.
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in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. " DOIT, Inc.
v. Touche, Ross & Co., 926 P.2d 835, 841 (Utah 1996) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
^|10 In addressing the Arnolds '* argument, the first issue is
whether the trial court properly concluded that section 78-12-35,
the tolling statute, see Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 (2002),
applies to medical malpractice cases, given the statute of
limitations provision of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act,
see id. § 78-14-4(2). The second issue is whether the trial
court correctly determined that the tolling statute is
inapplicable where a nonresident is subject to the jurisdiction
of Utah's courts and is amenable to service of process under
Utah f s long-arm statute, see id. §§ 78-27-24 to -25. As both the
application of a statute of limitations and the interpretation of
statutory provisions present questions of law, we review the
lower court's determinations on these issues for correctness.
See Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, % 18, 108
P.3d 741 ("'The applicability of a statute of limitations . . .
[is a] question[] of law, which we review for correctness. 1 ")
(quoting Spears v. Warr, 2002 UT 24, % 32, 44 P.3d 742); Sill v.
Hart, 2007 UT 45, \ 5, 162 P.3d 1099 ("This case presents an
issue of statutory interpretation, a question of law that we
review for correctness.").

ANALYSIS
I.

Interplay of Malpractice Act and Tolling Statute

fll Dr. Grigsby argues that "[t]he express statutory language
[of section 78-14-4(2)] . . . clearly demonstrates the intent
that the [Malpractice] Act be exempted from other tolling
statutes." We disagree.
^12 When interpreting a statute, we "construe[ it] as a
comprehensive whole." Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm'n,
916 P.2d 344, 358 (Utah 1996) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
[O]ur primary goal is to give effect to the
legislature's intent in light of the purpose
the statute was meant to achieve. The best
evidence of the true intent and purpose of
the legislature in enacting a statute is the
plain language of the statute. We therefore
look first to the statute's plain language.
Lieber v. ITT Hartford Ins. Ctr., Inc., 2000 UT 90, f 7, 15 P.3d
103 0 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). "In so
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doing, [w]e presume that the legislature used each word advisedly
and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and
accepted meaning." Arredondo v. Avis Rent A Car Svs., Inc., 2001
UT 29, \ 12, 24 P.3d 928 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted) (alteration in original). However, " [w] e will avoid an
interpretation which renders portions of, or words in, a statute
superfluous or inoperative." Platts v. Parents Helping Parents,
947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997).
^13

Utah Code section 78-14-4(2) provides in relevant part:
The provisions of this section
[detailing when a patient must file a
malpractice action] shall apply to all
persons, regardless of minority or other
legal disability under Section 78-12-36 or
any other provision of the law . . . .

Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) (2002) (emphasis added). According
to Dr. Grigsby, the language "regardless of . . . any other
provision of the law" means that the Legislature intended to
exempt medical malpractice actions from the effect of all other
statutory provisions that could conceivably toll the statute of
limitations. In support of this interpretation, he discusses
Griffiths-Rast v. Sulzer Spine Tech, Inc., No. 2:02CV1267, 2005
WL 2237635 (D. Utah Sept. 14, 2005) (mem.), aff'd, 216 F. App f x
790, 792 (10th Cir. 2007) (mem.), a federal court decision that
concluded section 78-14-4(2) "provides an explicit exception to
section 78-12-35." 4 Id. at *3. The Arnolds, on the other hand,
argue that, as the trial court in the instant case determined,
"the phrase 'or any other provision of [the] law 1 relates to
4. Of course, we are not bound by any federal court's
interpretation of a Utah statute, although such cases can surely
be persuasive. Moreover, the federal district court based its
interpretation that section 78-14-4(2) explicitly precluded
application of section 78-12-35 on the "all persons" language,
without due regard to the phrase immediately following it. See
Griffiths-Rast v. Sulzer Spine Tech, Inc., No. 2:02CV1267, 2005
WL 2237635, at *3 (D. Utah Sept. 14, 2005) (mem.), aff'd, 216 F.
App f x 790, 793 (10th Cir. 2007) (mem.). And the phrase that
follows the "all persons" language relied on by the federal
courts is what explains the rationale for such a provision: But
for the Legislature's desire to make its point about the
irrelevancy of "minority or other legal disability," there would
be no reason to include such a provision at all. That Utah law
applies to "all persons" goes without saying by reason of the
Uniform Operation Clause of the Utah Constitution. See Utah
Const, art. I, § 24.
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minors and others with legal disabilities, rather than
constituting a free standing clause." We agree with the Arnolds
and the trial court.
^[14 In its summary judgment order, the trial court determined
that section 78-14-4(2) did not exempt medical malpractice
actions from the reach of the tolling statute. It astutely
analyzed the issue as follows:
[I]t is clear to the Court that the language
"or any other provision of the law" refers
only to other provisions of the law which
define "legal disability." This reading is
supported by the fact that this language is
contained within a dependent clause which
refers back to, and clarifies the meaning of,
the term "all persons." The clause
"regardless of minority or other legal
disability under Section 78-12-36 or any
other provision of [the] law" is contained
within a single set of commas, indicating to
this Court that the legislature intended the
clause to refer to party status, rather than
to removing this provision from the scope of
all other provisions of law. Therefore, the
Court rejects Defendants argument on this
point.
We agree with this structural interpretation of the provision and
conclude that the phrase "or any other provision of the law" only
refers to other provisions of law relating to "minority or other
legal disabilit[ies]" that might otherwise affect the limitations
period. Tolling statutes that suspend the running of statute of
limitation periods for other reasons — like section 78-12-35-still apply.
fl5 We additionally note that, as the Arnolds contend, the
legislative history supports our interpretation of section 78-144(2). Section 78-14-4(2) as originally enacted provided in
relevant part:
The provisions of this section shall apply to
all persons regardless of minority or other
legal disability . . . .
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, ch. 23, § 4, 1976 Utah Laws 90,
94 (codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) (1977)). In 1979,
the Legislature amended this provision in response to Scott v.
School Board, 568 P.2d 746 (Utah 1977), see Blum v. Stone, 752
P.2d 898, 900 (Utah 1988), and added the clause "under Section
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78-12-36 or any other provision of the law.11 Malpractice Statute
of Limitations Act, ch. 128, § 1, 1979 Utah Laws 739, 740
(codified at Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) (Supp. 1979)) (current
version at Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) (2002)).
^16 To more fully explain, section 78-12-36 tolls the running of
a statute of limitation, unless the case involves "recovery of
real property, " for a person who "at the time the cause of action
accrued, [was] either under the age of majority or mentally
incompetent and without a legal guardian" throughout the period
of such person's legal disability. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-36
(2002) . In Scott, a minor failed to timely comply with the
notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act, and the
trial court granted the school district's motion for summary
judgment. See 568 P. 2d at 746. The Utah Supreme Court held that
"a minor claimant is justly entitled to the protection afforded
by said Section 78-12-36(1) . . . in all cases, including notice
requirements of the type contained in the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act." Id. at 748. In making this ruling, the Supreme
Court recognized that its conclusion was contrary to the
rationale adopted in other Utah decisions, see id., which held
that "specific statutes of limitation take precedence over the
general provisions of title 78, U.C.A., 1953, and that the
specific requirement of notice takes further precedence at least
as it may affect minors in the care of natural guardians," id. at
747.
^11
After the Scott decision, the Legislature, during floor
discussions, indicated that it was amending "section 78-14-4 [(2)]
in order to overturn a Supreme Court decision," the Scott
opinion. Blum, 752 P.2d at 900 n.2 (quoting Transcript of
Discussion and Vote in Utah House of Representatives at Third
Reading of H.B. 164 (Feb. 13, 1979)). As the Supreme Court noted
in Blum, both it and the Legislature "agreed that Scott at least
had the effect of tolling all statutes of limitations during
minority based upon section 78-12-36, absent clear legislative
intent to the contrary." Id. The Supreme Court also concluded
that " [t]he amendment evinced the legislature's determination to
apply the medical malpractice statute of limitations to all
plaintiffs' claims, including those of minors," and that it "was
adopted with a view to defeating the effect of the tolling
provisions of section 78-12-36." Id. at 900.
^[18 We conclude that this history shows that the Legislature
clearly intended to exempt minors and persons with other legal
disabilities from the reach of section 78-12-36 or other
provisions that might toll the medical malpractice statute of
limitations by reason of such disability. In light of this
specific provision enacted in response to case law, we must
presume that if the Legislature intended section 78-14-4(1) to
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also be beyond the reach of all other tolling statutes, including
those unrelated to "minority or other legal disability," Utah
Code Ann. § 78-14-4(2) (2002), it would have explicitly said so.
See Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 2004 UT 98, ^ 30, 104 P.3d 1208
("When examining the plain language, we must assume that each
term included in the ordinance was used advisedly. Additionally,
'statutory construction presumes that the expression of one
should be interpreted as the exclusion of another. ' Thus, we
should give effect to any omission in the ordinance language by
presuming that the omission is purposeful.") (citations omitted).
fl9 Dr. Grigsby further argues that interpreting section 78-144(2) as not preventing the application of section 78-12-35 to
medical malpractice actions is contrary to the declared purpose
of the Malpractice Act, as set forth in Utah Code section 78-142. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-14-2 (2002). That section declares:
In enacting this act, it is the purpose
of the legislature to provide a reasonable
time in which actions may be commenced
against health care providers while limiting
that time to a specific period for which
professional liability insurance premiums can
be reasonably and accurately calculated; and
to provide other procedural changes to
expedite early evaluation and settlement of
claims.
Id. We conclude, however, that our interpretation of section 7814-4(2) is not contrary to the purpose of the act, as it still
substantially limits the statute of limitations period for
malpractice actions and still provides the needed predictability
for insurance companies in the vast majority of cases. Moreover,
our interpretation should not cause malpractice insurance rates
to increase and will not deter healthcare providers from leaving
Utah. As the Arnolds argue, and as indicated in section II of
this opinion, all medical providers need do to make sure the
statute of limitations is not tolled if they leave Utah is
appoint an agent within Utah to receive service of process for
them. Finally, contrary to Dr. Grigsby's assertion, this
interpretation does not render the words "other provision of the
law" "superfluous or inoperative." The phrase simply refers back
to "minority or other legal disability," and meaningfully makes
clear that legal disability under any other provision of law will
likewise not toll the running of the malpractice statute of
limitations.
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II.

Interplay of Long-Arm Statute and Tolling Statute

^[20 While rejecting Dr. Grigsby*s interpretation of section 7814-4(2), the trial court nonetheless determined that the tolling
provision of section 78-12-35 did not apply in this case because,
under Utah's long-arm statute, Dr. Grigsby was subject to Utah's
jurisdiction and amenable to service of process in the state
where he resided. The trial court relied on Snyder v. Clune, 15
Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915 (1964), Van Tassell v. Shaffer, 742
P.2d 111 (Utah Ct. App. J 1987), and Ankers v. Rodman, 995 F. Supp.
1329 (D. Utah 1997), and reasoned that, because the Arnolds could
serve Dr. Grigsby in Tennessee, "the purpose of the tolling
statute . . . 'to prevent a defendant from depriving a plaintiff
of the opportunity of suing him by absenting himself from the
state during the period of limitation'11 was not furthered. While
there is a certain logic to the trial court's analysis, we
conclude that the trial court erred in making this determination,
as the issue was recently put squarely before the Utah Supreme
Court, which reached the opposite conclusion.
^21 In Olseth v. Larsen, 2007 UT 29, 158 P.3d 532, the Utah
Supreme Court answered a certified question of state law from the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. See id.
f 1. The question was whether
the statute of limitations tolled under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-3 5 when a person against
whom a claim has accrued has left the state
of Utah and has no agent within the state of
Utah upon whom service of process can be made
instead, but the person is amenable to
service pursuant to Utah's long-arm statute,
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 [.]
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
1(22 The appellee in Olseth argued that "when the purpose of the
tolling statute conflicts with its literal meaning, the purpose
must be given effect." Id. f 20. Accordingly, he claimed that
"the tolling statute should no longer apply because the need to
delay the running of the statute of limitations ceases to exist"
when "the long-arm statute . . . brings a defendant within the
personal jurisdiction of the court." Id. After considering the
creation and history of section 78-12-35, the plain language of
the statute, prior judicial decisions that have interpreted the
statute, and the deference owed to the Legislature, see id. ^f 14,
the Supreme Court
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h[e]ld that Utah Code section 78-12-35 does
toll the applicable statute of limitations
when a person against whom a claim has
accrued has left the state of Utah and has no
agent within the state upon whom service of
process can be made, even where the person
was at all times amenable to service pursuant
to Utah's long-arm statute.
Id. f 40 (emphasis in original). The Supreme Court also
indicated that prior Utah judicial decisions show that when a
case does not fall within the Nonresident Motor Vehicle Act, 5 an
appellate court should "apply a straightforward application of
the tolling statute to [the] claim." Id. U 36.
f23 The Arnolds claim that Dr. Grigsby left the state of Utah
during July 2000; no longer maintained a residence in Utah at
which substitute service could be effected, see Utah R. Civ. P.
4(d)(1)(A)/ but see Olseth, 2007 UT 29, M 27-29, 33-34, 36
(discussing Keith-O f Brien Co. v. Snyder, 51 Utah 227, 169 P. 954
(1917)); and never appointed an agent to receive service of
process for him in Utah. Dr. Grigsby does not challenge these
assertions. Accordingly, under Olseth, when Dr. Grigsby left
Utah in July 2 0 00 and did not appoint an agent within Utah, the
statute of limitations was tolled, preventing the time of his
absence from Utah from being calculated in the limitations
period. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 (2002) . Thus, even if the
statute of limitations began to run in November 1999, the
limitations period stopped running approximately eight months
later. Accordingly, the complaint was timely filed in December
2001.
CONCLUSION
1[24 While the trial court correctly determined that the tolling
statute, section 78-12-35, applies to medical malpractice claims
otherwise governed by the Malpractice Act, it erred in
5. " [T]he Nonresident Motor Vehicle Act . . . authorizes
substitute service of process on a nonresident motorist by
serving the Division of Corporations and Commercial Code."
Olseth v. Larsen, 2007 UT 29, f 29, 158 P.3d 532. See Utah Code
Ann. § 41-12a-505 (Supp. 2 007). Accordingly, the Utah Supreme
Court has held that "a nonresident motorist's absence from the
state d[oes] not toll the statute of limitations [because] by
statute an agent is appointed within the state to receive service
of process on behalf of nonresident motorists." Olseth, 2007 UT
29, H 29 (emphasis omitted).
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determining that the tolling statute does not apply to Dr.
Grigsby because he was amenable to service of process under
Utah's long-arm statute. Under Olsethf the tolling statute
suspends the running of the statute of limitations during the
time a defendant is absent from the state if he has not appointed
a Utah agent to receive service of process. This is true even if
the defendant is subject to Utah's jurisdiction and amenable to
service of process under Utah's long-arm statute. Accordingly,
we reverse the trial court's summary judgment and remand for such
further proceedings as are now appropriate.

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

K25

WE CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

James Z. Davis, Judge
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EXHIBIT B
November 21, 2005 Order of the Eighth District Court

DISTRICT COURT
~UCH5SNE COUNTY, UTAH

..OAV.«E i%fo\EE, CLERK
^ 1
DEDUTY

H

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAJL JibTRlCI COURT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GINA M. ARNOLD and CHARLTE S.
ARNOLD,

ORDER

Plaintiffs,

vs.
GARY B. WHITE, M.D., UINTAH BASIN [
MEDICAL CENTER, and DAVID
GRIGSBY, M.D.,

Case No. C2080O066
Judge JOHN R. ANDERSON

Defer, cants.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant David Grigsby' s
'hereinafter "Defendant") Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court
received Defendant's motion and supporting memorandum on September 22,
2005. Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition was filed with the Court
on October 0*7, 2005* Defendant's reply memorandum in opposition was
filed with the Court on October 24, 2905. The Court will grant
Defendant Dr. Grigsby'3 motion for the following reasons:
This action was commenced in this Court on December 04, 2001,
when Plaintiffs H i e d their complaint with the Court. The Court
finds, for purposes of this motion., that Plaintiffs discovered the
alleged injury no later than November 1999, which discovery started
the running of the two-year statute of limitations, per Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-14-4. At tnat time, Plaintiffs certainly suspected the alleged
injury may have beer: caused by negligence* This is evidenced by Mrs.
Arnold consulting an attorney and initiating a formal investigation in
her potential medical malpractice claim as early as September 1999.
Although the alleged injury and suspected negligence was discovered by
November 1999, the complaint was filed with the Court more than two
years laterf in December 20C1.
It is clear to the Court that Plaintiffs were aware, or should
have been aware, xvnen they discovered the alleged injury that the
Defendant had been involved in the medical treatment that Mrs, Arnold
had received while at Uintah Basin Medical Center (UBMC). This is

0V292

evidenced by: (1. the Ter^c;1. :-^o:ci identifying tie ~J fetdar.t as
being involved; <2% :he:r naming Dr. Grigsoy as ^ ;e:e\:a-'u :r. tne
initial ccnipiamt; ana (3; Plaintiffs deposition te::iTr«\ _nd_Lcatmg
they were aware ui De Cendant' s involvement. 01 course, vhetner or not
Plaintiffs knew of Defendant's involvement is ii>i,^^]v immaterial
for statute of limitations purposes. The statute of limitations is
not toiled simply because the identity of a particular potential
tortfeasor has net been discovered. Bank One Utah, N.A. v. West
Jordan City, 2002 UT App 271, 510, 54 P.3d 135. Thei-Loie, the Court
finds that, as a natter of law, tne statute of limitations for this
action against Defendant, Or. Grigsby, began running more tnan two
years prior to Plaintiffs filing their complaint on December C4, 2001.
without further argument, this finding would resolve the issue
and bar Plaintiffs' action against Dr, Grigsby. However, Plaintiffs
argue that the statute of limitations in this case has been toiled by
Defendant moving from the State of Utah, Plaintiffs cite Utah Code
Ann. S 78-12-35 (hereinafter ~the rolling statute"}, emphasizing the
following language: "If after a cause of action accrues (a potential
defendant] departs from the state, the time of his absence is not part
of the time limited for the commencement of the action." Tne
objective of this section was to prevent a defendant from depriving a
plaintiff of the opportunity of suing him by absenting nimself from
the state during the period of limitation. Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah
2d 254, 255, 390 ?.2d cn3,
916 (1964). The Utah Supreme Court has
held that under the tolling statute, the statute of limitations will
not be tolled wnen a defendant: is out of state, as long as he is still
amenable to service of process in the state of Utah. Lund v. Hail/
938 P.2d 285, 290 (Utah 1997). The Plaintiffs argue that once the
Defendant relocated to Tennessee, he was no longer amenable to service
"in the state of Utah," and as a result, the two-year statute of
limitations has been tolled since the date of Defendant's departure
from the state. Therefore, Plaintiffs argue that the statute of
limitations has not yet run on this action.
In response, Defendant argues that, because tnis action was
orougnt under Utah Code Arm. § 78-14-4 (the xxUtah Health Care
Malpractice Act"), the toiling statute does not apply. Utah Cede Ann.
§ 78-14-4 (?) reads in part, v The provisions of [Utah Code Ann. § 7814-4] shall apply to ail persons, regardless of minority or other
legal disability under § 78-12-36 or any other provision of the
law,„,." In support of this argument, Defendant cites a recent
federal district court case (Griffiths-Rast v. Sulzer S o o m e Tech,
Iftc. , 2005 WL 223765 'D, Utah)} for the proposition that the toiling
statute is inapplicable to cases involving Utah Code Ann. § 73-14-4.
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The Coui: 1^ :io_ persuaded by this argument. First, tne Co^r: rotes
that ~he decision in C :i £f iths-Rast is not binding authorirv upon :n s
Court. While Cr: J f 'ns-Rast can appropriately be cited and r-iied
jpoi, as persuasive authority, this Court is not obligated to foilov.
s~ch precedent. That said, i: : s clear to the Court that the ..an qua-re
u
or any other P L C V I ^ I O P of c:\e lav" refers only to other picv_'-_-jtb on
the law which define "lega_ disac;lity." This readinq is supported cy
the fact that. ft~s " ^nguage is contained within a dependent ^la..se
which refers back to, and clarifies the meaning of, the tern "ail
persons/' The clause "regardless of minority or other legal
disability under Section 78-12-36 or any other provision of law" is
contained within a single set of commas, indicating to this Co.art tnat
the legislature intended the clause to refer to party status, rather
than to removing this provision from the scope of all other provisions
of law. Therefore, the Court rejects Defendant's argument on this
ooint.
That said, Defendant does ma^e another, more compelling argument,
which argument the Court finds very persuasive. Although Defendant
relocated away from Utah while the statute of limitations was stii.1
running (approximately July 2000), Defendant argues that he, as a
nonresident, was still subject: to personal jurisdiction in Utah and
was amenable to service of process via the Utah long-arm statute, Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2"?-24. This is evidenced by the fact that Plaintiffs
ultimately served the Defendant using this very method. The Court
finds that, at all times from the date of alleged malpractice to the
present, this Defendant has been amenable to service of process and
potentially subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for the actions
underlying the Plaintiffs' complaint. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-27-24.
Therefore, Defendant argues that the toiling statute does not toll tne
two-year statute of limitations because the section does not apply to
nonresidents like hit! who are subject to service of" process by virtue
of Utah's long-arm statute.
Defendant cites Ankers v. Rodman, 995 F. Supp. 1329 (D. Utah
1997) to support his argument that, because of the long-arm statute,
the toiling statute does not apply in this case. The Ankers court, a
federal district court (like the Griffiths-Rast court above}, began
its analysis by noting that Utah's appellate courts had not considered
the specific issue of whether Section 73-12-35 applied to nonresident
defendants who are subject to service cf process under the long-arm
statute. This remains true to date. The Ankers court held that a
one-year statute cf limitation for an alleged battery had not been
tolled by a non-resident defendant's absence from the state of Utah
because the state long-arm statute made the defendant amenable to
2 of "

serv: ^ ti process before rne running of tc2 one-year statute o:
l.ritat. c-b .
To arrive at such a result, tne Ankers :jurt cited Snvaer T~.
CI ;re, 15 Utah ?d 754, 390 P.2d 915 (1564;, m which ihe Utah Supreme
Court adacessed tne applicability of the telling ^Ldtute to
nonresident motorists. In Snyder, the plaintiff filed suit against
the defendants three days after the applicable four-year statute of
limitatior.b expired. To avoid dismissal, tr.e plaintiff invoked the
telling statute, claiming the limitations ported was toiled oecause
ere defendants, California residents, returnee to California and
remained there after the accident. Although the trial court ruled for
the plaintiff, the Utar. Supreme Court reversed, concluding the purpose
of the toiling statute was ^to prevent a defendant from depriving a
plaintiff of the opportunity of suing him by assenting himself from
the state curing the period of limitation." Icu The court noted
that, oy virtue of tne nonresident motorist act, the plaintiff could
have served tne nonresident defendants any time through the Secretary
of State. Therefore, the defendants were never "'absent' from the
state in the sense contemplated by the statute, that is, unavailable
for the service of process." Id. The court further reasoned a
literal interpretation of the toiling statute u-ould permit claims
against nonresidents to survive indefinitely, J-U conflict with the
objective of a statute of limitations, although nonresidents could be
still be served with process. The court, thus, dismissed the
plaintiff's case as untimely.
In this case, Defendant Dr. Grigsby, a nonresident, claims his
situation is analogous to that of the nonresident defendants in Snyder
^rid ^nke^s. In these two cases defendants were deemed not to be
"absent" from the state, as contemplated by the toiling statute,
because tney were aubiect to service of process, one under the
nonresident motorist act (Snyder)and tne ctner under the state longarm statute (Ankers) . Defendant argues he, likewise, ^.as not been
^absent" from the state for purposes of the tolling statute.
Therefore, Defendant assorts, the limitations period should toll
against Plaintiffs because they could have, served Defendant under the
Icnq-arn statute any tinte within t;%«o years of the discovery of the
alleged injury at issue.
In Ankers, the federal district court also cited Van Tassell v.,
Shaffer, 742 P.2c ill (Utah App. 1907), where tne Utah Court of
Appeals examined the toiling statute as it related to plaintiffs who
secured judgments against a tjtah-resident defendant but waited over
eight years before acting to reaffirm tr.use judgments. Despite the
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fact that Tine defendant was a Utah resident: alienable tj sei'.ice ^ncer
tre Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, cine trial coart r^ied m favor of
t-:e plaint_ffs, c^iiC'Ldmg the linfii-.aticis period was relied w m i e nhe
aefcnciarc '*<ee absent from the state for oersur.di ana ousiress
purposes. T~e Van Tassell cour: determined Utan. fallows tne minority
rule rnof r r ^ u s statutes of limitations to be toiled .*~i.lc a
res.de:.: defendant is absent from the slcite even -nough service could
be effectuated at the defendant's residence. In its sarv-y of Utah
law, tine Uta.n Court, of Appeals found Snyder inconsistent with Utah's
prevailing view arid more indicative of the majority rule tnat "a
plaintiff s right of action ts not toliea while defendant is outside
of the state out remains subject to personal jurisdiction-" Van
Tassell, 7 42 P.2a at 112. The Ankers court noted that the Utah Court
of Appeals clearly favcred the majority rule, stating, "The majority
view, which holds that defendant's dibsenoe does not toil trie stature
of limitations where defendant is amenable to persorai jurisdiction,
would be preferred by this Court as the Utah rule, as we find it to be
more consistent with the purposes of statutes of i_:riitations." Id- at
113. Concerning the purposes of statutes of limitations, the Van
Tassel 1 court explained:
The purpose of statures of limitations would be undermined if rhe
tolling statute were applied in dases where defendant is an all
times amenable to service of process.... To allow tolling to
operate would mean that actions against absent defendants would
practically never be outlawed and that claims nay be neld in
suspense for years even though the action coula nave been
commenced through substituted service.
lri. at 113, n.3 {citing By m e v. Gale, 4bB P. 2d 716, 717 (Alaska
19U) ; .
The Van Tassell court noted Snyder did not overrule prior cases
nor was it distinguished, explained, or overruled by succeeding Utah
cases. Offering one explanation for this inconsistency m Utah law,
the appellate court recognized tne differences between residents, such
as the defendant in Van Tassell, and nonresidents, such as the
defendants m Snyder:
Snyder can arguably be distinguished from...other...[similar}
cases because it involved defendants who left the state
immediately after the [injury] which was the basis of the suit.
If tne statute of limitations had been toiled due to defendants'
aoser.ee, the action against tne nonresident motorist may have
been in suspense forever. In comparison, residents presumably
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*vii. event ua_jL/ re turf
a^^enc^s
riiv total .tar

o :he state, even tuouyu s^nur i c s u e .15'
years.

Io. at r-2 \empnas-o acded^ . This Court nor.es that Ankers, ar.c ire
present action mvolvira Dr. Grigsby, is distinguishable from C?n
Tasse' 1 on the sane grounds. Nevertheless, in view of the factual
co.ntert of Snyder, the C ^ U I L of Appeals "assume [d] that proceedings
unaer the nonresident motorist act are the only Utah proceedings _n
wnicn the applicaoie statute of limitations is not toiled by aiDS^r.c^
froip the state until a.nd unless the Utah bupreme Court states
otherwise." 742 P.2a ill at 113.
After reviewing tne Snyder and Van Tassell decisions, the inkers
court undertook the task of anticipating how the Utah Supreme Court
wouid apply the tolling statute to nonresidents subject to service of
process under Utah's iong-arrn statute. The Ankers court was convinced
that cases involving The nonresident motorist act are not the only
ones in which the Utah Supreme Court wouid decline to toll tne statute
of limitations due to absence from the state. That court found tnat
the Utah Supreme Court would net tell the statute of limitations, c\
applying Section "8-12-35, when a nonresident is subject to the JiQtacY
of Utan's ionq-am statute as well. The Ankers court believed th^
reasoning of the Utah Supreme Court in Snvder as well as that of the
Utah Court of Appeals m Van Tassell supported sucn a result.
This Court agrees. In keeping with the Snyder court's counsel to
interpret a statute "in the light of its background and the purpose
sought to be accomplished, " Snvaer, 390 P.2d at 916, this Court fines
that tne purpose of the toiling statute is xvto prevent a defendant
from depriving a piamtitt or the opportunity of suing him by
absenting himself from the state during the period of limitation."
Snyder, 390 ?.2d at 916, Van Tassell, 742 P.2d at 113. Here, because
Of the eftect of the long-arm statute, Defendant Dr. Grigsby's acsence
from the state did not deprive Plaintiffs of such an opportunity.
Moreover, this Court _s concerned that applying the telling statute to
nonresident defendants who are subject to service of process ccnflzcrs
with the purposes benind a statute of limitations, as suits against
such defendants could linger indefinitely. See Snyder, 390 P. 2d a:
916; Van Tassell, 742 P.2d at 113r n.2 and n.3. The instant case is
no exception, So long as Defendant remained absent from Utah,
Plaintiffs' malpractice claim could remain alive for years, regardless
of the fact that Defendant is, and has been, amenable to service ^nder
ttie long-arm statute. Also, as noted by the Ankers court, tne Uea.i
Court of Appeals' clear expression m Van Tassell of a preference for
a rule that a defendant's acsence from Utan does not toil tne
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applicable statute of lirdcations w-e- the dcfer.car.t is suoject ic
personal ]uri5d:cxLo.i in Utaa -e~ds t.:is Court to believe m a t the
scazd'e of limitations snouid r.oz be roiiec unoer tne facts of tnis
:ase. This Court notes that oecajsc Plaint ifrs could have filed *>-::
against Defendant ana served zr^c^tz^
j- der tre _cng-arin statute within
tne two-year statute of iintat. or. s, declining *-o apply the tolling
statute is not narsh or uniust. Because the court declines to apply
iccuor: 78-12-35 to toil the iimtations period for Plaintiffs'
medical malpractice claim due re Defendant's absence from Utah, the
Plaintiffs' claim against Dr. Grigscy is tirne-barred on its face.
THEREFORE IT IS HEREEY ORDERED that Defendant David Grigsby's
Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
Dated t
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clay of

7?0l<

,

2005.

ouh

ot

judge
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EXHIBIT C
December 20, 2005 Order of the Eighth District Court

FILED
DISTRICT COURT
DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH

DhC 2 0 2005
jq^NNEN^EE, CLERK
RY
U K ^ DEPUTY

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DUCHESNE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GINA M. ARNOLD and CHARLIE S.
ARNOLD,

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
GARY B. WHITE, M.D., UINTAH BASIN
MEDICAL CENTER, and DAVID
GRIGSBY, M.D.,

Case No. 020800066
Judge JOHN R. ANDERSON

Defendants.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant David Grigsby's
Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court received Defendant's motion
and supporting memorandum on September 22, 2005. Plaintiff's
memorandum in opposition was filed with the Court on October 07, 2005.
Defendant's reply memorandum in opposition was filed with the Court on
October 24, 2005. The Court will grant Defendant Dr. Grigsby's motion
for the following reasons:
This action was commenced in this Court on December 04, 2001,
when Plaintiffs filed their complaint with the Court. The Court
finds, for purposes of this motion, that Plaintiffs discovered the
alleged injury no later than November 1999, which discovery started
the running of the two-year statute of limitations, per Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-14-4. The complaint was filed with the Court more than two years
after the date of discovery. At that time, Plaintiffs certainly
suspected the alleged injury may have been caused by negligence. This
is evidenced by Mrs. Arnold consulting an attorney and initiating a
formal investigation in her potential medical malpractice claim as
early as September 1999. It is clear to the Court that Plaintiffs
were aware, or should have been aware, when they discovered the
alleged injury that Dr. Grigsby had been involved in the medical care
and treatment that Mrs. Arnold had received while at Uintah Basin
Medical Center (UBMC) . This is evidenced by: (1) the medical record
identifying Dr. Grigsby as being involved; (2) their naming Dr.
Grigsby in the initial complaint, which complaint was filed with this
1 of 2

Court on December 04, 2001; and (3) Plaintiffs deposition testimony
indicating they were aware of Dr. Grigsby's involvement. Regardless,
the statute of limitations is not tolled simply because the identity
of a particular potential tortfeasor has not been discovered. Bank
One Utah, N.A. v. West Jordan City, 2002 UT App 271, 110, 54 P.3d 135.
Therefore, the Court finds that, as a matter of law, the statute of
limitations for this action against Dr. Grigsby began running more
than two years prior to Plaintiffs filing their complaint on December
04, 2001.
Plaintiffs argue that the statute of limitations in this case has
been tolled by Dr. Grigsby moving from the State of Utah. Plaintiffs
cite Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35, emphasizing the following language:
"If after a cause of action accrues [a potential defendant] departs
from the state, the time of his absence is not part of the time
limited for the commencement of the action." The objective of this
section was to prevent a defendant from depriving a plaintiff of the
opportunity of suing him by absenting himself from the state during
the period of limitation. Snvder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 255, 390
P.2d 915, 916 (1964). The Utah Supreme Court has held that under Utah
Code Ann. § 78-12-35 the statute of limitations will not be tolled
when a defendant is out of state, as long as he is still amenable to
service of process in the state of Utah. Lund v. Hall, 938 P. 2d 285,
290 (Utah 1997). However, although Dr. Grigsby relocated away from
Utah while the statute of limitations was still running (approximately
July 2000) , he was still subject to personal jurisdiction in Utah and
was amenable to service of process via the Utah long-arm statute, Utah
Code Ann. § 78-27-24.
Dated this

jtf

day of

11&^<

, 2005.

BY THE COURT:

t Judge
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EXHIBIT D
Laws of the State of Utah - 1976 & 1979

LAWS
of the

STATE OF UTAH, 1976
Passed at the

BUDGET SESSION
of the

FORTY-FIRST LEGISLATURE

Convened at the Capitol in the City of Salt Lake
January 12,1976
and Adjourned Sine Die on
January 31,1976

Published by Authority

[93]

Physicians and Surgeons

Ch. 23

(20) "Certified social worker" means a person licensed to practice
as a certified social worker as provided in section 58-35-5.
(21) "Social service worker" means a person licensed to practice
as a social service worker as provided in section 58-35-5.
(22) "Social service aide" means a person licensed to practice as a
social service aide as provided in section 58-39-8.
(23) "Marriage and family counselor" means a person licensed to
practice as a marriage counselor or family counselor as provided in section 58-39-6.
(24) "Practitioner or obstetrics" means a person licensed to practice
obstetrics in this state as provided in subsection 58-12-3(5).
(25) "Patient" means a person who is under the care of a health
care provider, under a contract, express or implied.
(26) "Commissioner" means the commissioner of insurance as provided in section 31-2-2.
(27) "Representative" means the spouse, parent, guardian, trustee,
attorney-in-fact or other legal agent of the patient.
(28) "Tort" means any legal wrong, breach of duty, or negligent
or unlawful act or omission proximately causing injury or damage to
another.
(29) "Malpractice action against a health care provider" means any
action against a health care provider, whether in contract, tort, breach
of warranty, wrongful death or otherwise, based upon alleged personal
injuries relating to or arising out of health care rendered or which should
have been rendered by the health care provider.
(30) "Health care" means any act, or treatment performed or furnished, or which should have been performed or furnished, by any health
care provider for, to, or on behalf of a patient during the patient's medical care, treatment or confinement.
(31) "Future damages" includes damages for future medical treatment, care or custody, loss of future earnings, loss of bodily function, or
future pain and suffering of the judgment creditor.
Section 4. Statute of limitations.
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be
brought unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered the injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years
after the date of the alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except
that:
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider
is that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body,

Ch. 23

Physicians and Surgeons
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the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the
plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence
should have discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully
left in the patient's body, whichever first occurs; and
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented
from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently
conceal the alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through
the use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent
concealment, whichever first occurs.
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons regardless
of minority or other legal disability and shall apply retroactively to all
persons, partnerships, associations and corporations and to all health
care providers and to all malpractice actions against health care providers
based upon alleged personal injuries which occurred prior to the effective
date of this act; provided, however, that any action which under former
law could have been commenced after the effective date of this act may
be commenced only within the unelapsed portion of time allowed under
former law; but any action which under former law could have been
commenced more than four years after the effective date of this act may
be commenced only within four years after the effective date of this act.
Section 5. Requirements for damage recovery.
(1) When a person submits to health care rendered by a health care
provider, it shall be presumed that what the health care provider did
was either expressly or impliedly authorized to be done. For a patient
to recover damages from a health care provider in an action based upon
the provider's failure to obtain informed consent, the patient must prove
the following:
(a) That a provider-patient relationship existed between the patient
and health care provider; and
(b)
and

The health care provider rendered health care to the patient;

(c) The patient suffered personal injuries arising out of the health
care rendered; and
(d) The health care rendered carried with it a substantial and significant risk of causing the patient serious harm; and
(e) The patient was not informed of the substantial and significant
risk; and
(f) A reasonable, prudent person in the patient's position would not
have consented to the health care rendered after having been fully informed as to all facts relevant to the decision to give consent. In deter-

LAWS
of the

STATE OF UTAH, 1979
Passed at the

REGULAR SESSION
of the

FORTY-THIRD LEGISLATURE
Convened at the Capitol in the City of Salt Lake
January 8, 1979
and Adjourned Sine Die on
March 8, 1979

Published by Authority

JUDICIAL CODE

[7391

Ch. 128

(1) All class B and class C misdemeanors punishable by a fine less than
$300 or by imprisonment in the county jail or municipal prison not exceeding
six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment; and
(2) All infractions and the punishments prescribed for them.
Section 6. Repealer.
Section 77-12-6, Utah Code Annotated 1953, is repealed.
Approved February 28, 1979.

CHAPTER 128
H. B. No. 164

(Passed March 8, 1979. In effect May 8, 1979)

MALPRACTICE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
AN ACT AMENDING SECTIONS 78-14-4 AND 78-14-8, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953, AS ENACTED BY CHAPTER 23, LAWS OF UTAH 1976; RELATING TO
HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE; PROVIDING THAT THE LEGAL DISABILITY
OF AN INDIVIDUAL SHALL NOT ACT TO EXTEND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS SET FORTH IN THAT SECTION; PROVIDING THAT NOTICES OF
INTENT TO BRING MALPRACTICE ACTIONS BE SIGNED BY THE PLAINTIFF
OR HIS ATTORNEY; PROVIDING THAT THE NOTICE MAY BE SERVED BY
CERTIFIED MAIL; AND EXTENDING THE TIME FOR COMMENCEMENT OF
ACTIONS WHERE THE NOTICE IS SERVED LESS THAN 90 DAYS PRIOR TO
THE EXPIRATION OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section 1. Section amended.
Section 78-14-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 23,
Laws of Utah 1976, is amended to read:
78-14-4. Statute of limitations—Exceptions—Application.
(1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought
unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the
injury, whichever first occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of
the alleged act, omission, neglect or occurrence, except that:
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is
that a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the
claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff
or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have
discovered, the existence of the foreign object wrongfully left in the
patient's body, whichever first occurs; and
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented
from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because
that health care provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the
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alleged misconduct, the claim shall be barred unless commenced within one
year after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable
diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever
first occurs.
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons^ regardless of
minority or other legal disability under section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships,
associations and corporations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice actions against health care providers based upon alleged personal
injuries which occurred prior to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that any action which under former law could have been commenced
after the effective date of this act may be commenced only within the
unelapsed portion of time allowed under former law; but any action which
under former law could have been commenced more than four years after
the effective date of this act may be commenced only within four years after
the effective date of this act.
Section 2. Section amended.
Section 78-14-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as enacted by Chapter 23,
Laws of Utah 1976, is amended to read:
78-14-8. Notice of intent to initiate action—Application of act.
No malpractice action against a health care provider may be [com
monccd] initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor or successor, at least ninety days' prior notice of intent
to commence an action. Such notice shall include a general statement of the
nature of the claim, the persons involved, the date, time and place of the
occurrence, the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on
the part of the prospective defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and
other damages sustained. Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed
by the plaintiff [and] ov his attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure for the service of the summons and complaint in a civil action or
by certified mail, return receipt requested, in which case notice shall be
deemed to have been served on the date of mailing. Such notice shall be
served within the time allowed for commencing a malpractice action against
a health care provider. If the notice is served less than ninety days prior to
the expiration of the applicable time period, the time for commencing the
malpractice action against the health care provider shall be extended to
[ninety] 120 days from the date of service of notice.
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be
construed as relating to the limitation on the time for commencing any
action, and shall apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 1,
1976. This section shall not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or
crossclaims against a health care provider.
Approved March 20, 1979.

